With the passing of Singapore’s former Prime Minister and elder statesman Lee Kwan Yew last March, there has been a lot of discussion and reflection on his legacy. One aspect of that legacy that has been much celebrated, even among his detractors, has been Singapore’s success in reducing corruption. Indeed, in virtually every international survey or ranking of countries’ corruption levels, Singapore comes out very well. In Transparency International’s 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) rankings, for example, Singapore scores 84 out of 100, perceived as the 7th-least corrupt country in the world, and the least corrupt in the Asia. In TI’s most recent Bribe Payers Index (BPI), from 2011, which ranks exporting countries according to their firms’ perceived propensity to pay bribes abroad, Singapore scores 8.3/10, ranked 8th out of 28 countries (in a tie with the United Kingdom). And the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 2012 evaluation of Singapore’s anti-money laundering system gave the country generally high marks (though with some areas of concern). Singapore is widely touted as a major anticorruption success story (see, for instance, the laudatory introduction to this New Yorker piece) and a model for other countries to follow.
He realized that if the nation was to develop as a successful industrial society, its population should have an improved quality of life and the environment should be protected.
The overall philosophy was thus that economic development of the city–state could not be sustained and the quality of life of its people could not be significantly improved, unless environmental factors were considered as important as development issues.
In terms of overall investment, Chou (1998) estimates it at S$200 million (US$159.8 million). He also cites some of the specific expenditures such as S$21 million (US$16.7 million) to form beaches in the Kallang Basin and S$13 million (US$10.3 million) including removal of mud and some structures and expenditures incurred by Port of Singapore Authority, HDB and other government agencies. Leitmann (2000) puts the cleaning cost at S$200 million (US$159.8 million), excluding the costs of public housing, food centres, industrial workshops and sewerage. According to Tan (2009), however, the clean-up cost the government nearly S$300 million (US$239.7 million), excluding resettlement compensation. It is not clear whether it included costs incurred directly and indirectly in manpower, time and education programmes targeting general public and schools, etc.
Stop calling Lee Kwans name unless you laborites are willing to deal with corruption and quality of life initiatives to move the nation forward. Waxing about how he saw Manley as Quixotic does not excuse the fact successive JLPNP governments haven't dealt with the aforementioned like Lee Kwan.